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Abstract
The paper examines how is it possible for an incumbent political party to stay
in power for long periods of time without having to trade-off rents for holding office.
It presents a new way of explaining and measuring the real effects of rent-extraction
on political re-election in local government. It models local government due to the
different and exact way rent-extraction can be measured there; through pork-barrel
spending on public goods upon which a political party is able to extract rents.
Setting rents as an endogenous variable permits the model to evaluate their effect
on political re-election and preservation of power. The paper alters certain typical
assumptions of other political agency models in order to test its effects in a more
realistic scenario of politics.
The incumbent’s decision on rents and public good production directly affects the
state of the economy upon which the voters decide whether to re-elect the incumbent
or not. Incumbents make their decisions based on observing the economic growth
shock. In a repeated game setting an incumbent will always chose the optimal
strategy with respect to the observed growth shock. This way, for high enough
levels of economic growth an incumbent party may stay in office for an infinite
amount of periods and keep maximizing rents with respect to the given constraints,
without having to trade-off rents for holding office. The paper presents empirical
evidence on United States gubernatorial and state legislature elections from 1992 to
2008 to evaluate the underlining theory.
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1 Introduction
The principal-agent relationship in politics is concerned with an inability of voters (prin-
cipals) to fully control what the politicians (agents) do. Without full power of account-
ability and transparency, politicians who hold an informational advantage can misuse
their political power in order to obtain an excess amount of budgetary funds, defined as
political rents gained from pursuing office.
According to Tullock (1967) and Krueger (1974), rents are defined as any form of
private benefits acquired from the political arena. This includes any monetary or non-
monetary concessions acquired by politicians through restricting competition by un-
necessary regulation, protecting or creating monopolies or any other form of satisfying
various interest groups through prone legislation. This paper recognizes rents in a sim-
ilar but somewhat different fashion. Rents take the form of excess payments extracted
through public good expenditures on various pork-barrel projects and are obtained by
an incumbent politician. The rent-extraction process is most easily explained through
corruption and misappropriation of budget funds for private benefits. For example while
building a road or a bridge a politician can conceal his rent-extraction by presenting one
price to the public while charging a different (lower) price to the contractor, thus taking
the difference for himself. Ferraz and Finan (2011) recognize such corruptive activities
as frauds in public procurement, diversion of public funds (expenditures without proof
of purchase) and over-invoicing (buying goods above the market price). These types
of actions are more easily and frequently done on a local level than on a national level
which is why the paper focuses on local politics.
The crucial effort of engaging into corruptive activities is to ‘hide’ the rent-extracting
process within the public good creation function, thus making rents fully endogenous.
The paper follows insights from Mauro (1998) that different types of government ex-
penditures provide different opportunities for corruption, where high-technology goods
provided by specialized oligopolies (defence spending) or large infrastructure projects
could be more likely for collecting bribes and rents than, for example, education spend-
ing. In general it is much harder to extract rents from individualized social transfers
than from public investments. This is why the paper uses public good expenditures as
a proxy for rents.
In addition, a variety of constitutional boundaries (budgetary transparency) and
media exposure prevent the politicians from openly determining rents within the bud-
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get constraint, as is the general assumption of political agency models (Brennan and
Buchanan, 1980; Besley, 2006; Besley and Smart, 2007; Persson and Tabellini, 2000).
The problem with the oversimplified assumptions of such models are quasi-linear pref-
erences which make the public good function independent of rents, implying that the
preferred level of public goods is an increasing function of its cost shock.
The models of political agency as summarized in Besley (2006) describe a general
setting in which a rational agent’s maximization problem is to capture political rents
outside the market in the political arena where he controls budgetary expenditures. The
principals are unable to observe the budgetary allocation process directly, creating the
problem of electoral accountability of politicians (the monitoring problem). Uncertainty
and asymmetric information give further incentives to politicians to misrepresent them-
selves and pursue their own interests. Due to such behaviour of agents there exists a
trade-off between voter utility (policies appealing to voters) and rent-extraction (policies
appealing to politicians in power) (as shown in Brennan and Buchanan, 1980; Besley,
2006; Persson and Tabellini, 2000). The central issue is whether or not electoral compe-
tition and the discipline effect of the voters will induce the politicians to announce voter
optimal policies or rent-maximizing policies.
The models are often characterized by a two period setting in which a politician’s
term ends in the second period (the term limit assumption in Besley and Case 1995a,
1995b; Alt, de Mesquita and Rose 2011; Ferraz and Finan, 2011). In order to stay in office
and reach the second period the incumbent politician should limit his rent-extraction
in t = 1, since retrospective voters will reward congruent behaviour. The re-election
incentive should improve the discipline of politicians. However, in the second and final
period (t = 2), a moral hazard problem arises since bad politicians are free to divert
the entire budget towards their private means. In classical moral hazard models (Barro,
1973; Ferejohn 1986) the homogenous voter observes the action of the politician but with
a noise. The politician observes this noise before making his action (or level of effort),
which depends on the re-election rule chosen by the voters to limit the incumbent’s
incentives for rent-extraction. The focus of these models is on the discipline effect.
In expanding the moral hazard problem, newer models introduced adverse selection
(Austen-Smith and Banks, 1989; Banks and Sundaram, 1993; Besley and Case, 1995a;
Rogoff, 1990; Persson and Tabellini, 2000; Besley and Smart, 2007) concerning how good
politicians should distinguish themselves from bad ones, where the first period behaviour
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of bad politicians implies “mimicking” the behaviour of good politicians and sacrificing
first period rents in order to remain in office and expropriate the entire budget for rents
in t = 2. The probability of a politician doing so depends on his time preference for
money, i.e. the discount factor. So apart from the discipline effect the selection effect
is added where candidate types determine the competency of politicians in providing
public goods, or in determining whether or not they are likely to extract more rents.
The candidate’s choice of policy will determine his type and send a signal to the voters
on re-election.
This paper, modelled in a public choice tradition, is concerned only with the discipline
effect and the moral hazard problem as it makes three assumptions that alter the political
environment of general political agency models. The first one is a single candidate type,
which removes the selection problem, the second is modelling party politics in local
elections (to eliminate the term limit effect and introduce reputation), and the third one
are endogenous rents, determined within the public good creation function, presenting
the proportion of budgetary funds allocated towards pork-barrel spending and white
elephant projects.
It builds on the findings of Ferejohn (1986) and Persson, Roland and Tabelini (1997),
where a rent-maximizing agent will apply a certain effort to satisfy the voters and derive
an endogenous utility (rent) from holding office. The dynamic setting emphasizes more
clearly the source of power of the politician as his ability to choose a preferred policy,
while the voters need to adjust their voting rule so as to leave the politician enough
rents. In many of these assumptions if the level of the shock isn’t big enough, neither
will the politician’s effort and he will defect towards diverting the entire budget towards
rents. Due to a number of constitutional boundaries this isn’t plausible, since he can
only divert a small part of the budget for personal gain.
Political agency models tend to get caught up in modelling the term limit assumption
and disregard the relative persistency of certain politicians in office, which is indeed a
factual phenomenon (where certain parties tend to stay in office for 20 to 30 years,
particularly on a local level). The paper attempts to fill this gap in the literature, on
the line of the theoretical assumptions made in de Mesquita et al (2005), or Helland and
Sorensen (2012). The Helland and Sorensen (2012) paper is particularly useful in that
perspective as it offers genuine insights on persistent rent extraction, although it fails to
fully endogenize rents.
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The model predicts that during times of negative growth shocks the incumbent will
increase the amount of pork-barrel projects knowing he is facing less rents in future
periods, while during times of positive shocks he will reduce current rent-extraction as
he anticipates better future rent-extracting opportunities. A positive shock changes a
politician’s time preferences and makes him more patient, and therefore rewards him with
re-election. After defining the political environment and the model’s main assumptions,
the paper specifies voter and political strategies and decision rules, upon which the
equilibrium levels of public good production and the state of the economy are determined.
2 Political environment
The paper challenges some general assumptions of most political agency models. The
first assumption is that all politicians are rent-seekers implying that the voters don’t
face adverse selection but only the moral hazard, discipline problem. In the public
choice tradition, politicians seek to maximize their private interest from holding office
by implementing their preferred policies. While providing the general public goods for
the satisfaction of voter preferences and thus generate favourable public outcomes, they
have a strong incentive to divert some of the budgetary allocation towards pork-barrel
spending from which they aim to extract rents. Even though some of these policies yield
a negative welfare effect, they are rational for an individualist self-interested point of
view. This finding goes back all the way to Buchanan and Tullock’s (1962) or Brennan
and Buchanan’s (1980) definition of politicians as self-interested utility maximizers or
the more recent de Mesquita et al (2005) who assume that
“...all political leaders, regardless of their institutional setting, have a
common utility function that emphasizes first holding onto (or gaining) office
and second maximizing their personal income while in office.”(de Mesquita
et al, 2005, pp.21).
Political selection models such as Besley (2004) or Casselli and Morrelli (2004) imply
a similar finding where the selection of politicians is adverse and always produces bad
politicians. The assumption is that opportunity costs of working in the market sector
are too high for high-ability individuals so there will always be negative selection of
candidates into politics. Even if high-ability citizens were allowed to enter office in
order capitalize on their pre-political experience such as predicted by Matozzi and Merlo
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(2008) or in Gagliarducci et al. (2010) there are still incentives for these individuals to
enter the political market in order to obtain personal benefits for themselves, meaning
they will still engage into a trade-off with the voters over the optimal policies.
The second assumption is that the paper observes political parties rather than indi-
vidual politicians. This assumption goes in line with the work of Snyder and Ting (2002)
or Levy (2004) where political parties are shown to be better in aggregating within-party
preferences over optimal policies and appealing to voters in a multidimensional policy
space. The multidimensional setting is more realistic since all budgetary decisions are
made on a local level where state and local authorities assign public projects and dis-
tribute federal spending. The governor isn’t the only one making the allocation decisions;
they are made within-party lines since the benefits from being in-office are shared with
other members of the executive branch and party legislators. After the governor’s term
limit expires the party looks to remain in power with a new candidate. Parties care
of their future re-election probabilities and have mechanisms to discipline “lame duck”
individual office-holders who have an incentive to ignore the party’s long run credibility.
When using political parties instead of candidates the paper moves beyond the two
period setting and avoids the last period effect, modelling an infinitely repeated game
such as in Ferejohn (1986) or Banks and Sundaram (1993). An infinitely repeated
game implies introduction of reputation and constant interaction between politicians
and voters, as applied by Alesina (1988). The paper’s assumption is that the incumbent
wishes to maximize his time in office since a political party isn’t constrained by any
constitutional boundary of how long it can stay in office. It can hold office persistently
while only changing its politicians.
Existence of parties eliminates the emphasis on term limits. With term limits repu-
tation is less important in the final term where expropriation of rents can commence. By
introducing continuous agents on the political arena - parties - this idea loses support. In
modern democracies incumbent politicians do care about the reputation of their party,
but also of their own. If politicians engage in other activities when they exit or retire
from office or if they seek to run for higher office (such as assumed and modelled in
Diermeier, Keane and Merlo, 2005) then the reputational capital they create for them-
selves is an important decision parameter. The paper overlooks the aspects of political
competition between the in-office and the opposition party in order to only focus on the
dynamics of electoral control.
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The third assumption is the aforementioned approximation of rents within the public
good expenditures function. As opposed to the Leviathan scenario in Brennan and
Buchanan (1980) where all budget revenues can end up in rents, this paper takes into
consideration other constitutional budgetary obligations, namely social transfers and
public sector wages, in addition to budget transparency which significantly diminishes
scope for the misuse of public funds. In addition endogenous rents mean that they
cannot be extracted directly from tax revenues; instead they must be hidden within
budgetary expenditures that provide the easiest rent-extracting opportunities (such as
public investments on infrastructure projects or defence spending, as assumed by Mauro,
1998).
3 Model
The model is defined as an infinitely repeated game between the voters and incumbent
political parties. In each period an incumbent political party has to make budgetary
decisions on the allocation of social transfers (f), public sector wages (w) and public
good expenditures (g). The paper broadens the classical budget constraint often given
in political agency models such as in Besley and Smart (2007), Persson and Tabellini
(2000) or Brennan and Buchanan (1980), by including social transfers, public sector
wages, and by removing rents directly from the budget constraint and inserting them
within the public good creation function.
An incumbent party faces the following budget constraint in each period:
τy = g
(
θ′, r
)
+ T + V (1)
Where T =
∑n
i=1 f
i are aggregate transfers to the public (social and unemployment
benefits, pensions etc.) while V =
∑n
i=1w
i are aggregate public sector wage expenditures
of the government. The term on the left is total revenue (tax rate τ , times aggregate
income). Taxation is proportional to the level of income. There is a balanced budget
every time, i.e. there are no budget deficits or public debts. The first term on the
right g =
∑n
i=1 gi are total public good expenditures which depend on the realization
of rents (r) and actual costs of all public goods (θ′), which are stochastic, distributed
on θ′ ∼ u [0, c], and known only to incumbent politicians. A single public good gi
expenditure function is defined as:
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gi
(
θ′i, ri
)
= θiGi =
(
θ′i + ri
)
Gi (2)
where ri = θi − θ′i = λgi (3)
Expenditure for a single public good equals total costs of the public good as presented
to the public (θi) times the total quantity of the good (Gi = 1). The term (θi) represents
the unit cost of a public good as presented to the public (through official sources and
the media), while θ′i represents the actual cost of goods which are never observed by the
public and known only to the politician. ri are rents extracted from providing a single
public good and present the difference between total costs and actual costs. They can’t
be set directly in the budget function (1) due to the assumption of budget transparency;
rather, they must be concealed and extracted indirectly within the public good expendi-
ture function. The way rents are defined in (3) implies that an incumbent party assigns
a fixed weight (λ) from every single public good it produces to rent-extraction1. The
factor λ ∈ [0, 1] can be interpreted as political preferences towards budget misappropri-
ation and pork-barrel spending2. It is an endogenous, random, cultural shock, drawn
by nature specifically for every politician. The political and institutional environment
in which the incumbent operates along with its intrinsic preferences towards rents, will
determine the total amount of pork-barrel projects (similar to de Mesquita et al, 2005).
The relative size of rents will according to (2) and (3) depend on total quantity of
public goods produced, and it can also be inferred from (3) that rents depend on how
much a single public good actually costs; ri =
λ
1−λθ
′
i, for 0 ≤ λ < 1/2. Since λ is always
kept fixed for a single agent, an increase in rents can only be obtained by an increase
in total funds diverted towards public good expenditures (g). The levels of total costs
and the quantities of public goods will add uncertainty in total rent-extraction. For
higher total costs an incumbent gets more rents but less public goods, if a politician
were to keep g in the same level as before. Hence the total quantity of public goods will
depend on the realization of the cost shock, while total rent-extraction will depend on
1Imagine a political party demanding a commission for any procurement it allows. This commission
(a percentage of costs of a good that goes directly into the politicians’ pockets) stays the same in relative
terms for any project, but increases in absolute terms as more government revenue is allocated to public
good expenditure each period. So if λ = 0, 2 then 20% of spending on a single public good is allocated
towards rents.
2In stable democracies λ is likely to be a small number, as political preferences towards corruption
and budget misappropriation are rather small, but not nonexistent.
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total public good expenditures and the preferences towards corruption.
3.1 Rents
After making the decision on public good expenditures an incumbent will get a certain
payoff, defined as rents r ∈ [0, r̂], which can only be diverted from the pork-barrel
projects it creates. This implies that rents and public goods are characterised by a
quasi-linear preference relation, where rent-extraction begins after a certain point, once
the initially desired level of public goods and services are provided. Accordingly, equation
(2) can be rewritten into an aggregate public good expenditures function:
g =
n∑
i=1
gi = (1− λ)
m∑
j=1
Gj + λ H
(
θ′, r
)
for all i ∈ N, and for all j ∈M,where i 6= j
(4)
With:
∂g
∂θ′
< 0,
∂g
∂r
> 0,
∂g
∂λ
> 0 (5)
Where Gj is some initially desired and provided amount of public goods (for which
the total amount of expenditures is g), while H(·) is a quasi-convex function depicting
the total amount of pork-barrel spending (upon which rents are defined). Public good
expenditures are an increasing function of total rent-extraction and the propensity to
extract rents (which differs from one party to the other), and a decreasing function of
actual costs. It’s easy to see from (4) that higher spending allocated towards public
good expenditures (as a budget item) is the only way to increase rent-extraction via
more pork-barrel spending, with λ kept fixed. The size of pork-barrel spending within
the public good expenditures function depends on the given value of λ3.
Rents are drawn independently from a cumulative distribution function F (r |g) .
They are defined between the minimum required amount of public good spending (de-
noted as g) which imply zero pork-barrel spending and hence zero rents (r = 0) and the
maximum possible amount of public good spending, where the entire budget is diverted
towards public goods (ĝ = τy) and a certain fixed number of pork barrel projects, for
which rents are r = r̂:
3Similar to the single public good expenditures function (2), a value of λ = 0, 2 would imply 20% of
public good spending going towards pork-barrel projects and 80% towards voter preferred public goods.
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W (r) =
∫ ĝ
g
rdF (r| g, λ) (6)
3.2 Decision parameter
The incumbent party will base its budgetary allocation decisions as well as its rent-
extraction upon observing a random stochastic shock β, uniformly distributed on β ∼
u [−, ]. Some political agency papers use a random noise variable that depicts either
a productivity parameter transferring resources into public goods (Persson et al, 1997),
a public good cost shock (Persson and Tabelini, 2000, and Besley and Smart, 2007) or
any exogenous occurrence that will determine the effort of a politician (Ferejohn, 1986).
This paper uses a similar random shock parameter that will determine the next period
level of taxes and public goods. It can most simply be described as an economic growth
shock that affects the next period budget of the incumbent. For example, a high shock
will signal a higher future level of tax revenues (τ y¯) and consequently higher expected
rent-extraction. The politicians observe β with certainty each period before they make
their decision, while the voters observe β with a probability q ∈ [0, 1].
3.3 Re-election threshold and the state of the economy
In each period the incumbent party chooses an initial policy through which it collects a
certain amount of taxes and subsequently allocates a certain amount of budgetary funds
towards public goods, wages and transfers. Even though it seeks to maximize its rents
by setting higher taxes and diverting more spending to pork-barrel projects, it also has
a desire to remain in office and thus needs to keep its constitutional commitment to
public sector wages and social transfers4. Holding office is only attractive because of
rent-extraction opportunities.
Voters expect the incumbent party to determine some intrinsically optimal level of
spending and taxes, ψv(gv, τv), which is different from the optimal level desired by politi-
cians5. An incumbent party will always have an incentive to determine a combination of
4We can think of the commitment towards public sector wages and social transfers as one possible
constraint to rent-extraction and diversion of funds towards pork-barrel spending.
5Some groups value certain amount of spending more than others (social transfers recipients and pub-
lic sector workers), and some groups will favor more public goods, but all to a certain extent above which
further spending and further taxes would damage the electoral chances of the incumbent party. Pers-
son et al (1997) paper recognizes the conflicting interests over the composition of government spending
between voters and the politicians. Their choice variable encapsulates this assumption.
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taxes and spending higher than the public optimum (in order to satisfy various partial
interests necessary for its re-election6):
ψ̂(ĝ, τ̂) > ψv(gv, τv) (7)
Apart from satisfying partial interests, the utility functions of the politicians include
rents, which is why their desired optimal levels of spending and taxes must be higher
than the voters’. The intuition of the paper is that because of hidden rents politicians
will aim to secure higher public good spending (via more pork-barrel projects), and
hence levy higher taxes, thus increasing the overall size of government. The empirical
evidence on the increasing size of governments in the past 50 years (see Maddison, 2001,
or Tanzi and Schuknecht, 2000) verifies this intuition, although the paper disregards the
possible effect of intrinsic voter preferences towards more redistribution, a larger safety
net, or other factors recognized by Higgs (1987), and focuses solely on rent-extraction
as a partial explanation for growth in size of government. A new line of research would
be needed to establish this relationship with certainty. By trying to find a proxy for
rents and tie them with re-election probabilities, this paper attempts to show that rents
in form of political income from holding office are the source of political self-interest
and motivation for increased public spending (as implied by Buchanan, 1975; but also in
Acemoglu and Verdier, 2000, or Goel and Nelson, 1998, even though they focus primarily
on corruption).
Due to the existence of uncertainty and the consequential problem of political ac-
countability, the voters cannot prevent the incumbents from determining higher than
optimal taxes and spending, but can punish them ex-post. The voters will punish any
behaviour of incumbents that set the level of taxes and spending above some control
level ψ(g, τ), which is higher (and thus worse off) than the voter optimal level, but still
lower than the maximum level desired by the incumbent party:
ψ̂(ĝ, τ̂) > ψ(g, τ) > ψv(gv, τv) (8)
The control level of ψ, represents the voter re-election threshold that measures po-
litical effort and the consequential satisfaction of voter utilities, and above which the
6The paper doesn’t model transfers to special interests, but works on the findings of other political
agency papers which offer intuitive results where, because of special interests, the level of spending by
politicians will always be higher than the optimum desired by the voters (see Coate and Morris, 1995).
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incumbent party will be voted out of office. According to Ferejohn (1986) this thresh-
old is a level of the politician’s effort determined by voters, which shouldn’t be set too
high to encourage rent-extraction, nor too low to encourage shirking. In Persson et al
(1997) they use abstaining from effort as a category of measuring utility, upon which
the politician can divert resources to private use. Instead of observing size of effort, this
paper focuses on the deviation from a set of randomly determined boundaries of public
policy which can trigger voter dissatisfaction. It uses the stochastic growth shock as a
decision threshold for politicians and the public policy parameter as a decision threshold
for the voters. The role of voting is to achieve a higher level of discipline and hence
lower rent-extraction.
According to the assumptions of the re-election threshold the probability of winning
for the incumbent can be determined as:
pI =
1, if ψv ≤ ψ ≤ ψ,0, if ψ > ψ. (9)
Office oriented parties will avoid losing the election, and will aim to respect the voter
re-election threshold for a sufficiently favourable shock β, even though this will generate
for them a lower than maximum amount of rents. The intuition is that in order to get
re-elected politicians need to sacrifice some of their own utility from higher rents, by
committing to a credible (constitutionally bound) promise of ensuring wages for public
sector workers as well as transfers to various social groups. Any level of spending and
taxes that will break up the delicate balance of budgetary expenditures will result in
loosing voter support from those affected. For example if public sector wages would
cease to grow at their predetermined level, this would result in discontent from public
sector workers, creating a distorted picture of the government to the median undecided
voters leading to a lack of political support for the incumbent. This distorted signal of
the government’s in-office performance defines the state of the economy (σ). The state
of the economy doesn’t necessary imply economic performance, but rather signals sent
in-between voters. The voters decide on the re-election of the politician based on the
realization of the state of the economy shock, where σ ∈
{
σ0(ψ0), . . . , σn(ψ̂n)
}
.
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3.4 Timing
Timing starts by a observing a political party in power in their first term in office (t = 0)
which has to make a decision on allocating budgetary spending.
1. Incumbent party observes βt−1 (previous period shock) and receives a signal of
whether to expect high or low levels of rents in the current period. It will also
observe the stochastic cost shock θ′. Party preferences towards rents, λ are know
to the incumbents.
2. Upon observing the shocks with certainty, during its term in office the incumbent
continuously chooses total levels of public good expenditures g and taxes τ , and
consequently ψ. Voters do not observe the policies set by the government directly.
They cannot observe the final level of rents, nor the actual costs of public goods, but
can observe the shock β with probability q, and update their threshold accordingly.
3. After the first half of the term spent in office7 the incumbent party can observe
current period shock, βt upon which it anticipates expected future rents (from t = 1
onwards) and upon which it bases the final decision on public good expenditures
and rent-extraction in t = 0.
4. The final chosen level of ψ conditions a certain state of the economy, σ. Voters
observe the state of the economy (σ) and decide whether or not to support the
incumbent. The voters are unable to prevent rent-extraction, but can punish the
incumbent ex-post, implying that the re-election threshold is ex-post optimal. The
incumbent party at the end of the period gathers all the rents they have extracted
during which makes their rent-extraction complete for the current period.
5. Elections. A poor state of the economy infers an incumbent who extracted too
much rents and is thus elected out of office, while a good state of the economy
infers an incumbent who pleased the voters just enough to remain in office.
The entire process is repeated for all t ∈ {1, . . . ,∞}. Each period the incumbent faces
the same decisions and pre-observes the same parameters before making these decisions.
7One can easily imagine a term of two or four years of length, where one strategy is applied in the
first half of the term, while a different strategy is applied in the second part of the term, similar to the
political business cycle theory. βt is the growth shock one year before the elections (for a two year length
of a term).
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The voters also play strategies based on the levels of the re-election threshold, which is
updated every period according to their preferences and the shock β.
4 Voter and political utilities
4.1 Voter utility
Voters make decisions based on signals of political behaviour and actions of politicians.
They evaluate whether a party deserves to remain in office depending on how it sets taxes
and distributes public spending, and how this can shape the state of the economy and its
in-office performance. Although they are free to observe policies the model implies that
the voters act under the Downsian (1957) rational ignorance assumption and choose not
to engage in direct observation of politician activities as this may prove to be too costly.
There is one median, undecided voter group8 consistent of voters homogenous in their
preferences over the re-election threshold. These voters receive the signal of political
performance through the state of the economy parameter.
Due to their rational ignorance, voters monitor in-office performance of incumbents
rather than a direct policy (as in Ferejohn, 1986, or Persson et al, 1997). Performance
is based on the voter decision rule and the manifestation of the rule on their decision
utility. The voter expected utility function is dependent on the realization of the state
of the economy shock (σ) and the political decisions on taxes and spending9:
E
∞∑
t=0
δtu (σt|ψt) (10)
where 0 < δ < 1 is the discount factor, while u (σt|ψt) is a concave utility function
monotonically increasing in σt. The utility function is twice continuously differentiable
with partial derivatives denoted as uσ and uψ, strictly increasing in σ, strictly decreasing
in ψ, and jointly concave in both σ and ψ. The voters’ perception on the state of the
economy, and the signal of political performance they receive is defined as:
σt = µ[1− f (ψt)]2 + qβt (11)
8We can easily assume a large number of groups, however in each case the median, undecided group
will be crucial for political re-election. The median group is the one with the highest density and most
swing voters (as in Persson and Tabellini, 2000).
9Voter utility is observed only from the effect of political performance on the voters.
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Where βt is the election year shock while µ is a nonnegative constant random variable
depicting the institutional environment which cannot be affected by the politician in the
short run, but only in the long run. It will determine the slope of the state of the economy
curve. It is obvious from (11) that the incumbent choice variable ψt will determine the
voter perception of the state of the economy, and hence his re-election choice. If β is
observable with a positive probability (q = 1), then voters will update their preferences
over the re-election threshold. If σ = f (ψ (β)), where ∂σ∂β > 0 and
∂ψ
∂β < 0, then positive
shocks will imply the voters desiring lower taxes and spending, while negative shocks will
imply the opposite10. If q = 0, then the preferences on the threshold don’t get updated.
An easier way to look at the threshold is to determine the desired optimal values
of ψ that satisfy an aggregate voter utility function within a set of plausible outcomes
in which the upper boundary of the set would be the control level ψ. The re-election
threshold would be defined within a positive, increasing set of different choices on bud-
getary redistribution Ω ∈ [ψ,ψ]. The voter optimal provision of taxes and spending,
ψv(gv, τv) is necessarily equal to ψ11. Any level of public good provision within these
boundaries would send a signal of positive in-office performance and consequentially a
good state of the economy, σ ∈ {σ (ψ) , σ (ψ)}.
From the point of view of homogenous voters, they will gain in utility for all ψ ∈ Ω.
Hence their expected utility can be re-written as:
E (U) =
∫ ψ
ψ
udF (ψ) +
∫ ψ̂
ψ
0 · dF (ψ) . (12)
4.2 Incumbent utility and strategy
The incumbent party is a rational utility maximizer seeking to win elections in every
period in order to have an option of extracting rents. Holding office is only attractive
because of rent-extracting opportunities. In order to stay in power it needs to choose
a combination of ψ ∈ Ω, according to the re-election constraints in (7) and (8). It
comprises its utility by adding up expected utilities from future expected rents.
10The intuition is that in times of crises (which would be an example of a negative shock) the majority
of the voters expect more intervention from the government, as shown by Higgs (1987) on the US case.
11According to (8) ψ̂(ĝ, τ̂) > ψ(g, τ) > ψv(gv, τv), the politicians always have an incentive to set taxes
and spending higher than the voter optimal distribution. Even if they behave completely congruent,
they would aim to satisfy the ψv threshold but never go below it, as this would jeopardize both theirs
and the voters’ utilities.
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The incumbent party’s utility is a combination of ego rents from holding office and
rents that can be extracted once in office. Since the position of holding office is primary
attractive because of possible rent-extracting opportunities, the optimal strategy of the
incumbent party is to keep this position as long as they are able to maximize the flow
of rents in the current period and expected rents in future periods. In t = 0 this utility
is achieved with certainty (since it is already in office), while in every subsequent period
it depends on the probability of winning office. The previous period β will determine
higher or lower expected future rents:
U0I = R0 + βt−1
∫ ĝ
g
r0 dF (r|g, λ) . . . t = 0 (13)
EU1I =
(
R1 + βt−1
∫ ĝ
g
r1 dF (r|g, λ)
)
pI (ψt−1) . . . t = 1 (14)
. . .
EUnI =
(
Rn + βt−1
∫ ĝ
g
rn dF (r|g, λ)
)
pI (ψt−1) . . . t = n (15)
In every period t = 1, . . . ,∞ the incumbent decides on a new combination of taxes
and spending, and hence rent-extraction from an affordable set of pork-barrel projects.
An incumbent’s ex ante utility (expected utility at the start of term t = 0) is:
EUI = E[U
0
I (r|g, λ)] + pI (ψ0)β0
n∑
t=1
δtE[U tI (r|g, λ)] + (1− pI (ψt))E[U tC ] (16)
The first term denotes expected utility in the actual period t = 0 as defined in (13);
the utility it will receive at the end of the first term in office, when total rents are realized.
The second term is the sum of all future discounted expected utilities when in office12,
from period t = 1 onwards, if it wins the election with probability pI (ψ0) depended
on satisfying the re-election threshold in period t = 0. The incumbent’s future rents
will depend on β0 in the current period t = 0 as it will signal how big expected rents
might be in period t = 1. The final term denotes the probability of losing the election
if the party doesn’t respect the re-election threshold (9) and the utility it will get if the
12For simplicity ego rents are normalized to zero in all future periods.
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challenger, the opposition party, is now in office. This utility for the incumbent might
even be negative once the opposition party is in office, as too much rent-extraction may
be subject for punishment (such as a corruption trial).
The incumbent plays the same infinitely repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma game each
period. A cooperative strategy implies adapting voter expectations and respecting the
re-election threshold every period in order to remain in office. Any defection from this
strategy will result in loss of elections (immediate punishment) and an inability to extract
further rents. The game can be thought of as a tit-for-tat Prisoner’s Dilemma game
where any deviation from a cooperative strategy is met with immediate punishment from
the voters. Even though the agent does change after the voters imply a punishment
strategy, from the voters’ perspective they always play a tit-for-tat game where they
punish defection and reward cooperation.
A repeated game setting compares the defection and cooperation strategies of the
incumbent party starting from its first term in office, t = 0. The incumbent plays a
cooperative strategy if and only if the expected utility from the cooperative strategy is
higher than the expected utility from the defection strategy:
E[U0I (r|g, λ)] + β0
n∑
t=1
δtpI (ψt−1)E[U tI (r|g, λ)] ≥ E[U0I (r̂|ĝ, λ)] + E[U tC ] (17)
The term on the right of the equation presents expected utility from taking maximum
rents (r̂,∀r ∈ ĝ = τy) and the utility the party gets from a challenger in power, achieved
with certainty for a defective strategy. When it defects it does so to maximize rent-
extraction but is faced with no immediate future payoffs in terms of rents. Utility in
t = 0 will either be cooperative (with (r, g)) or defective (with (r̂, ĝ)), and will depend
on the level of βt−1 observed in the previous period, before holding office (as in equation
13). However, the incumbent’s decision is based on anticipating what future rents will
be. It observes β0 in the current period (one year before the elections in a two year term),
and bases its decision of current period rent-extraction on anticipated future rents. It
chooses to defect only when the β parameter is sufficiently small (or negative) so that
it might find itself in a better position now with maximum rents then with future lower
rents.
Proposition 1. Incumbent party will form its strategy on rent-extraction and conse-
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quently its chances of re-election based on the realization of the current period shock β0.
For any
β0 ≥ E[U
0
I (r̂|ĝ, λ)] + E[U tC ]− E[U0I (r|g, λ)]
n∑
t=1
δtpI (ψt−1)E[U tI (r|g, λ)]
= β∗ (18)
the incumbent party always plays a cooperative strategy and chooses its level of rent-
extraction and public good creation with respect to the voter re-election threshold, while
for any
β0 <
E[U0I (r̂|ĝ, λ)] + E[U tC ]− E[U0I (r|g, λ)]
n∑
t=1
δtpI (ψt−1)E[U tI (r|g, λ)]
= β∗ (19)
the incumbent party will always defect and by extracting too much rents be voted
out of office. These set of strategies solved for β0 are a unique sub-game perfect Nash
equilibrium strategy of the incumbent party’s repeated game.
Proof: See Appendix A.
The intuition is as follows. In bad times during a negative shock (β < β∗, σ < σ),
if the incumbent party wants to stay in office it needs to limit its rent-extraction even
further in order to get re-elected (more spending towards redistribution programs, or
programs that are aimed at a short-run boost to the economy, imply less scope for pork-
barrel projects13, according to equations 1 and 4). The incumbent party in this case
decides it will be too costly for them (in the sense of less rent-extraction) to maintain
the current threshold.
However, because of the negative shock, observed partially by the voters (with a
positive probability q), the voters update their beliefs and update their threshold of
taxes and spending (expectations of higher spending will result in higher values of ψ).
Whatever the threshold level of spending and taxes, there will always be some β < β∗
for which the incumbents will find it profitable to deviate14. It would take a stronger
negative shock for the politicians to choose this strategy15. When it does occur, the
13Even though ’bridges to nowhere’ tend to be a good short-run stimulus mechanism.
14Keep in mind that holding office is only attractive due to the possibility of rent-extraction.
15As the denominator in (17) increases (the probability of satisfying the threshold is higher) it takes
a lower level of β∗ than before to trigger a defection strategy from the politicians.
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situation is similar to reaching a term limit in the standard political agency framework
when the incumbents extract maximum rents in this period knowing they will be removed
from office in the next one. When the incumbent observes β ≥ β∗ they will behave and
perform in a cooperative fashion and opt to stay in power, knowing they will be able to
extract higher rents in future periods.
The shock β acts as a decisive factor for an incumbent on whether or not to play a
cooperative strategy. It observes βt−1 from before holding office and receives a signal of
what costs (θ′) to expect in period t = 0. After observing both stochastic components
(βt−1 and θ′) the party can anticipate the level of rents in the current period but cannot
anticipate their level in future periods. Upon observing βt in the middle of the current
period it will make its final decision on whether or not to respect the re-election threshold.
The paper finds empirical evidence on this assumption by linking economic growth (a
proxy for shock β) from one year before the elections to the approximation of the ψ
parameter in the election year. The beliefs on the shock β are updated every period
upon which the party forms expectations of rents in future periods and decides whether
to cooperate or not.
4.3 Equilibrium
The incumbent’s allocation strategies in each period can be summarized in Figure 1.
The first graph on the lower left depicts the quasi-linear relationship between rents
and public good production (as described in (4)). Rents increase with public good
expenditures only after a certain initial allocation. The intuition is that each state needs
a crucial initial level of public goods to be produced and it isn’t plausible to extract rents
below that point. For a level of public good expenditures less than or equal to g rents
are zero. Any increase of public good expenditures above g substantially increases rents,
as here is where the pork-barrel spending kicks in (λ is realized - it determines the
slope of the curve). Voter welfare will be increasing at a decreasing rate due to the
concavity of their utility function. The intuition is that sometimes politicians produce
certain public goods that aren’t of crucial importance for the voters but it nonetheless
increases their aggregate welfare (such as organization of public concerts, parades, or
building stadiums). As more public goods start satisfying partial interests (pork-barrels
that benefit certain interest groups), fewer voters will experience an increase in their
marginal utility. At the point in which public goods produced inflict more harm than
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Figure 1: Relationship between public good production, rent-extraction and re-election
good to the majority of voters, their aggregate utility will start to decrease. It can
also be interpreted that after a certain point the incumbents will extract more rents for
themselves (or for special interest groups as predicted by Coate and Morris, 1995) than
the public goods it creates, which will trigger a decrease in aggregate voter utility. The
model predicts this to be observed for any point of rents higher than r (and public goods
higher than g).
Proposition 2. If the incumbent party is a rational rent-maximizer, it has no desire to
choose any level of public good spending lower than or equal to g (and no ψ lower than
or equal to ψ). The chosen level of public good expenditures will always be:
g > g (r) and ψ > ψ (20)
Proof: See Appendix A.
The intuition is clear. Any ψ ≤ ψ, meaning that g ≤ g, implies rents to be r = 0. It
wouldn’t be profitable for a rent-maximizing incumbent not to produce any pork-barrel
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projects, as this would imply zero rents. Also, any ψ < ψ wouldn’t be Pareto optimal
as it would trigger a decrease in voter utility. The finding in Proposition 2 enables us to
focus only on the effect after ψ
(
g
)
.
The final graph is a quasi-concave curve depicting the relationship between ψ and σ.
For rising initial levels of public good expenditures and overall spending and taxation,
the state of the economy parameter increases at a decreasing rate, as voter preferences
for public goods and other forms of spending are being satisfied. However, after the
point of interest ψ
(
g
)
further spending on pork-barrels and white elephants yields a
decreasing state of the economy, as voter perception tends to react negatively on signals
of political satisfaction of personal and partial interests. The deteriorating state of the
economy caused by higher rent-extraction will leave more and more voters dissatisfied,
who will after a certain point ψ > ψ, for which the state of the economy would be σ < σ,
elect an incumbent party out of office. The threshold level ψ will present the point above
which further rent-extraction gains disproportionally more to the incumbent than to the
voters.
Proposition 3. Assume the incumbent party observes β ≥ β∗. If the party maximizes
rents via the public good expenditures function, and if the re-election probability depends
on staying within the desired set Ω ∈ [ψ,ψ], it will always choose the voters’ higher
threshold level ψ, for the observed high level of β. The equilibrium levels of public good
expenditures and the public policy parameter ψ are then:
g∗ = g and ψ∗ = ψ (21)
Both the public policy parameter and public good production increase voter welfare
at a decreasing rate: ∂W∂g > 0,
∂2W
∂g2
< 0, and ∂W∂ψ > 0,
∂2W
∂ψ2
< 0. The incumbent will
converge towards the optimal equilibrium level of g∗ from which it can extract the optimal
amount of rents, r∗ = r.
Proof: See Appendix A.
If g would be the total final amount of public good spending, then the area from g
to g depicts total pork-barrel spending, while r to r depicts the total amount of rents.
By converging to the equilibrium g∗ and ψ∗, for a high enough shock β, an incumbent
party is able to maximize both its rent-extraction (r∗ = r) and its chances of re-election,
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since the voter threshold for the current period is respected, ψ ≤ ψ.
Proposition 4. If the equilibrium public good expenditure is g∗ = g, and the equilibrium
public policy parameter is ψ∗ = ψ according to Proposition 3, and under the assumption
of the incumbent observing β ≥ β∗, the equilibrium level of the state of the economy is
then always:
σ∗ = σ (ψ∗ (g∗)) (22)
Proof: See Appendix A.
A possible normative implication would be that rent-extraction leads to a misappro-
priation of resources which implies worse off in-office performance. Instead of achieving
a higher state of the economy σ, the equilibrium revolves around a lower σ. In addition,
Proposition 3 would imply higher than optimal taxation and government spending (since
ψ∗ = ψ > ψv) thereby possibly explaining some rapid growth of government size in the
past century. Further empirical verification is needed to evaluate such an implication.
5 Empirical evidence
The empirical implication of the paper is that upon observing a sufficiently negative
growth shock, the re-election threshold will be disturbed via more pork-barrel spending,
leading to the electoral defeat of the incumbent. Crucial in this is the effect of threshold
ψ on the probability of re-election. The paper tests the following findings: (i) an increase
of ψ (which is approximated by public good spending) decreases the probability of re-
election after a certain level; and (ii) a decrease of real growth (β, approximating a
negative shock) one year before the elections will lead to an increase of ψ, i.e. higher
spending on public goods.
5.1 Data and empirical strategy
A panel data is collected for gubernatorial and state legislature elections (both upper
and lower house) for 48 continental U.S. states over the period from 1992 to 2008. The
database contains state elections for every two years and 9 elections for both governors
and the state legislature. The reason for using data on United States is its availability
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and the same methodology of data collection and measurements for each state. The
analysis becomes even more robust due to the fact that all 48 states are accountable to
the same constitutional and legal boundaries and the same democratic order. In order to
estimate the effects on electoral results the data is collected for state and local spending
of each state observed, along with the variables of economic performance proven to have
an effect on re-election of incumbents according to Brendner and Drazen (2008) and
Besley and Case (2003). The summary statistics of all variables used in the model are
presented in Tables 1 and 2 in Appendix B. The sources and explanations of electoral
data, budget spending and all other variables used are given in Appendix B under the
summary tables.
The empirical strategy estimates the following linear probability model of the effect
of changes in ψ on the electoral success of the incumbent:
Iit = αi + γ1ψit + γ2ψ
2
it + µXit + ϑDit + it (23)
The dependent variable Iit for state i and time t is the dummy indicator that takes
the value 1 if the incumbent governor is (re-)elected or if the party stays in majority in
the state legislature and the value 0 if the incumbent governor loses the election or the
party loses its majority. For a Republican governor in power if on the next legislature
elections the Republicans lose the senate and/or assembly elections, the value given is 0.
If the Republicans win this implies that they retain majority (or have won the majority
in a previously Democratic held assembly), the value assigned is 1.
The explanatory variable is the threshold, ψit, which is approximated by public
good spending. It is a difficult task to decompose public good spending into pork-
barrel projects and spending on voter desired public goods. Political actions towards
concealing rent-extraction within the budget allocation process make this task even
more difficult (similar problems arise with attempts to measure political corruption).
This is why the paper assigns a proxy to try to evaluate the effect of rents on re-
election probabilities in form of higher public good spending, in particular higher pork-
barrel spending. To capture this the paper observes public good spending defined as
capital outlays (definition given in Appendix B under Table 2), with respect to all other
budgetary current expenditures (such as social transfers or employee wages), and capital
outlays per capita.
Of the two parameters, capital outlays per capita seem to be a more precise mea-
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sure since they allow to observe for the direct effect of only an increase in public good
spending, without implicating other types of pro-cyclical policies (which are included in
the ratio of capital outlays to other budgetary expenditures, and can potentially bias it
downwards in times of negative shocks). In addition capital outlays represent the type of
spending from which it is most likely to extract rents (an assumption similar to Mauro,
1998).
Parameters γ1 and γ2 measure the effects of the threshold on incumbent re-election.
The squared value ψ2it should be able to indicate the concavity of the voters’ preferences
over the threshold as presented in Figure 1 (provided that γ2 turns out negative). The
model offers a unique prediction that the threshold should increase up until a certain
level, labelled ψ above which it wouldn’t be optimal for the incumbent party to continue
with rent-extraction, if it wants to stay in office.
The control variables are in line with those used in some empirical political agency
models16. These can be divided into a vector of economic (Xit) and demographic (Dit)
differences between states that may affect the likelihood of incumbent re-election. The
economic controls include measures of economic performance such as GDP growth in the
election year and in one year before the elections, revenues and expenditures growth,
unemployment rate, growth in personal income and deficit to GDP ratio. The demo-
graphic controls include total state population, share of population under 15 (young)
and share of population over 65 (old), implying that states with too much old or young
people will have higher levels of targeted social spending.
When using gubernatorial and state election panel data the paper uses state fixed
effects (denoted by αi) to control for unobserved heterogeneity. This way the focus of
the estimates is shifted from across state differences to within state differences. The
drivers of the potential bias are unobserved characteristics (such as ideology, individual
and party preferences, and politician ability) that tend to differ between states but are
assumed to be constant over the short period of time observed. The ratio in each state
is driven by different kinds of unobservable bias so by including state fixed effects the
cut-off values of the ratio is allowed to differ across states.
The problem arising when using a linear probability model is the inability to get
good estimates for extreme values of the explanatory variable. In the dataset used, the
explanatory variables (public good spending p/c and public spending ratio) don’t tend
16For example in Besley and Case (1995b, 2003) or Smart, Sturm (2006).
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to take extreme values for any state observed. The extreme values reported in Table 2
are for the entire sample, but when observing each state individually the extreme values
tend to be within a 10% range. The problem of heteroskedasticity is controlled for by
using robust standard errors, clustered by state.
5.2 Results
Before testing the effect of the threshold on re-election, it is necessary to estimate whether
there is a link between a negative growth shock and higher public good spending, as
assumed in Proposition 1. This could appear to be a trivial finding, since politicians
could simply be applying countercyclical measures to combat a negative growth shock.
To try and overcome this potential bias the paper only looks at the effect of the growth
shock on public good (capital outlays) spending per capita, which will serve as a proxy
for potential pork-barrel spending. It also observes the effects of the shock on total
expenditures and a ratio of public good spending to other expenditures to see whether
or not the incumbent party is increasing overall spending (and implementing pro-cyclical
policies) or is it applying a defection strategy of increasing their rent-extraction, as
assumed by the model. If the former is the case then it can be said that a negative
growth shock signalled higher rent-extraction (or at least the approximation of rent-
extraction).
The following regression equation is estimated:
ψit = αi + ηitβit + µXit + ϑDit + ζit (24)
where ψit denotes the capital outlay spending per capita as the dependent variable
in regressions (1) and (2) in Table 3. Regression (3) observes total expenditures as the
dependent variable, while regression (4) observes ratio of capital outlay spending over
current expenditures as the dependent variable in order to see whether the shock is
being translated only to pork-barrel spending or to total spending as well. βit is the
main explanatory variable denoting real GDP growth of the state i one year before the
election. This describes the stochastic shock of the current period (βt), upon which
politicians anticipate future rents. If economic growth is sufficiently low in the year
before the election (with respect to Proposition 1), the incumbent anticipates lower next
period rents and increases rent-extraction in current period via higher capital outlay
spending. Parameter ηit measures the total effect of GDP growth on capital outlays per
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capita. Control variables are the same used in (23), while unobserved heterogeneity is
controlled for by including state fixed effect, αi.
The results are presented in Table 3 in Appendix B. Columns (1) and (2) show that a
lower observed real GDP growth leads to an increase in spending on capital outlays per
capita, under 1% and 5% significance levels. In terms of the model this would imply that
a negative shock is interpreted to increase spending on public goods from which it is more
likely to draw rents. The inclusions of control variables increased the explanatory power
of the model (with a higher R-square and F-test). They show the obvious implications,
such as higher total expenditures result in higher capital outlay spending (although
there is no significant relationship with higher revenues). The unemployment rate and
higher share of young and old show an inverted relationship where it is expected that
for a decrease in all of these factors, spending on capital outlays will go up. This seems
logical since they imply less expenditure for social transfers, thus freeing up funds for
public good creation. Finally, the term limit effect signals that as the end of the final
term for the governor approaches, even though he has an increasing likelihood to extract
more rents17, the party as a whole will try to decrease public good spending in order to
remain in power. The conclusion differs for parties than it does for individual politicians,
which is what the model implied in its assumptions of modelling an infinitely repeated
game.
In order to achieve stronger confirmation of the relationship between a negative
shock and higher public good spending, we need to examine whether the growth shock
affects current expenditures and expenditures in general. Hence in columns (3) the
paper tests whether public good spending with respect to other current expenditures
(employee wages, social transfers) will react the same way to the negative growth shock,
while column (4) tests the same proposition for total budgetary expenditures as the
dependent variable. For neither of the two regressions do we get statistical significance
of the explanatory variable, implying that a negative growth shock won’t affect neither
total spending nor a ratio of spending. It will only yield a significant effect for capital
outlays. A possible explanation is that a variety of countercyclical policies (e.g. higher
social transfers) prevented the observed effect on the spending ratio and total spending.
This could imply that in times of negative shocks politicians either use capital outlays
and pork-barrel spending to increase their electoral chances, or to maximize their rent-
17As empirically proven by Alt, de Mesquita and Rose (2011), Besley and Case (1995b), Ferraz and
Finan (2011) and Smart and Sturm (2006).
26
extraction before being elected out of office, thus deliberately choosing to defect. The
findings of in Table 4 could shed more light on the total effect.
The results of the main prediction of the model - the effect of the threshold on
re-election - are presented in Table 4 in Appendix B. Column (1) observes the direct
effect of capital outlays per capita on re-election using state fixed effects to control
for unobserved heterogeneity, while columns (2) and (3) include other economic and
demographic variables. According to the results shown in columns (1) to (3) it can be
inferred that over time the increasing levels of capital outlays per capita increase the
probability of re-election for the incumbent and imply higher public good spending each
period. As the population increases, the tax base is larger, revenues are higher and so are
the expenditures. The finding goes in line with the prediction in Proposition 2, where
the threshold chosen would always be the higher level. However, the negative value of
the square parameter, significant at a 1% level in column (3), implies the concavity of
voter preferences where too high levels of capital outlay spending lead to a decrease of
voter utility that can cause the incumbents to lose office. The inclusion of the term limit
variable signals a significant negative relationship implying that if the party’s governor
is reaching a term limit, the likelihood of the party remaining in office will decrease.
This is why the party will try to improve its winning probability by decreasing capital
outlay spending when observing poor growth, as predicted by the term limit effect in
Table 3.
The growth of public good expenditures with respect to current expenditures, shown
in columns (4) to (6) implies the same conclusions, only at a lower significance, although
their results should be taken with caution, since it cannot be determined with certainty
which parts of budgetary expenditures are driving the ratio upwards: higher capital
outlays or lower current expenditures. By observing only capital outlays per capita, we
can make stronger inferences on the effect of rent-extraction on re-election.
Economic performance indicators in all regressions in Table 4 seem to show weak and
non-significant effects on the probability of re-election. This could be explained by the
fact that economic performance of states matter far less in local elections than it does on
a national level. The political business cycle theory predicts that the aforementioned set
of variables could influence electoral results, but they are more applicable on a national
level. In local politics budgetary redistribution and public goods play a much more
important role. A good way to observe the economic performance indicators would be
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to include the federal level of growth and tie it to whichever party is in power nationally,
as similarly done in Diermeier et al (2005).
Overall the empirical evidence presented tends to support the main propositions of
the model. For a low level of observed GDP growth, presenting the shock β, the incum-
bent party tends to increase spending on capital outlays, thereby potentially increasing
their pork-barrel spending, and with it their rent-extraction. This corresponds to a
defection strategy implied in Proposition 1. For a higher level of growth fewer funds
are allocated towards capital outlays and more towards current expenditures in order to
increase the probability of the incumbent to stay in office and extract more next period
rents. Higher spending on capital outlays tends to increase re-election probability but at
a decreasing rate since too much spending on public goods implies that the incumbent is
not allocating enough funds to satisfy the basic voter preferences, and is moving beyond
the voter threshold ψ. Contrary to the political business cycle theory, politicians in lo-
cal elections won’t manipulate economic performance indicators (such as GDP growth)
in order to get elected, they will try to manipulate budgetary expenditures and their
rent-extraction based on the signals sent from the economic environment. The economic
performance indicators act more as a signal to politicians on rent-extraction than to
voters on re-election.
6 Conclusion
The main attempt of the paper was to develop a political agency model that observes
how political parties can stay in office for long periods, without having to trade-off rent-
extraction for staying in power. Political rents are determined endogenously within the
public good expenditure function where they increase for higher expenditures on pork-
barrel projects. The paper focused on explaining the moral hazard problem of incumbent
politicians, where their rent-extraction is constrained by introducing a voter threshold
denoted by voter preferred levels of taxes and spending, which get updated every period.
Altering the optimal levels of taxes and spending will influence the state of the economy
upon which the voters base their re-election decisions. The model stresses the importance
of a repeated game setting and a stochastic shock that will determine the incumbent
rent-extracting decisions. When observing a positive shock the incumbent will play a
unique equilibrium cooperative strategy, since it expects more future rents, and will
never be voted out of office. For a negative shock (insufficient growth) the incumbent
28
will play a defection strategy where it extracts the maximum available amount of rents.
For a cooperative strategy the state of the economy ends up within the voter’s threshold
and they will reward the incumbent with re-election. For a defection strategy the state
of the economy is disturbed and the voters apply an immediate punishment for the
incumbent.
The empirical evidence presented tends to support the claims stated in the paper
using U.S.A. states data. It finds a negative relationship between the economic growth
shock and spending on capital outlays, which serve as a proxy for pork-barrel spending
and rent-extraction. Higher levels of capital outlay spending increase the probability of
re-election up until a certain level when further public good production will yield the
incumbent party out of office.
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A Appendix
Proof. Proposition 1:
Define the cooperative strategy of the voters as ar, and the cooperative strategy of
an incumbent i as si = (si1, . . . , sin), for every si ∈ Ω. Any si outside the re-election
set presents a defective strategy of the incumbent denoted as s−i. The incumbent plays
first and if it plays a cooperative strategy si the best response of the voters is to play
cooperate as well ar in every stage. If the voters would deviate for a cooperative strategy
of an incumbent (play a−r) they would send a signal to the incumbent to play a deviation
strategy in the next period and extract maximum rents. Therefore, this strategy profile
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isn’t optimal for the voters. They will only use a deviating strategy upon observing
a deviation from the incumbent. If an incumbent decides to deviate and play s−i, his
expected payoff will be E[U0I (r̂|ĝ, λ)] +E[U tC ]. However, there will be no future payoffs
for the incumbent, since his action will trigger a defection strategy from the voters.
Even though in the first period it is obvious that any defection strategy will yield a
higher immediate payoff, E[U0I (r̂|ĝ, λ)] > E[U0I (r|g, λ)] which is true since r̂ > r and
ĝ > g∀r, g, the incumbent will not chose a defection strategy every period as it also
values future rent opportunities. Ex ante rents are calculated based on the sum of all
future utilities β0
∑n
t=1 δ
tpI (ψt−1)E[U tI (r|g, λ)]. By comparing payoffs from cooperative
and defective strategies the incumbent will compare utilities of both actions adjusted for
future expected utilities.
A strategy profile s∗i for a repeated game is a Nash equilibriuim if the strategy si is
the best response given what the voters will play when observing a defection strategy:
s∗i ∈ arg max
si∈Ω
ui
(
si, s
∗
−i
)
For any incumbent i, it must be shown that ui(si) ≥ ui(s∗−i). The incumbent plays a
cooperative strategy if and only if the payoff from a cooperative strategy is higher than
the payoff from a defection strategy, as stated in equation (17) from the model:
E[U0I (r|g, λ)] + β0
n∑
t=1
δtpI (ψt−1)E[U tI (r|g, λ)] ≥ E[U0I (r̂|ĝ, λ)] + E[U tC ]
where ψt−1 concerns the threshold level in the previous period with respect to future
utilities from t = 1 onwards. Solving the upper equation for βt yields the optimal
strategy for the incumbent:
β0
n∑
t=1
δtpI (ψt−1)E[U tI (r|g, λ)] ≥ E[U0I (r̂|ĝ, λ)] + E[U tC ]− E[U0I (r|g, λ)]
Playing a cooperative strategy (si) is optimal if and only if:
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β0 ≥ E[U
0
I (r̂|ĝ, λ)] + E[U tC ]− E[U0I (r|g, λ)]
n∑
t=1
δtpI (ψt−1)E[U tI (r|g, λ)]
= β∗
An incumbent cannot get a better payoff by deviating for any beta0 ≥ β∗, meaning
that the cooperative strategy solved for beta0 is a Nash equilibrium of the tit-for-tat
game for the incumbent. The game is a repeated stage game, repeated in every single
period. A sub-game perfect equilibrium of a repeated game includes a stage game Nash
equilibrium in every sub-game. Since the stage game Nash equilibrium is played every
period, or in every sub-game, it is by definition a sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium.
Proof. Proposition 2 (By contradiction): Any level of public goods g < g implies two
effects; a non-optimal amount of rents (r = 0) and no re-election (as the voter re-
election threshold Ω ∈ [ψ,ψ] isn’t satisfied). Any level of public goods g = g implies
re-election since the re-election threshold is respected but the level of rents is still r = 0.
Incumbent party utility maximization function is according to equation (13) depended
on rent-extraction (any r > r). A rent maximization strategy disables the incumbent
from choosing any g = g and therefore obtaining no rents. Since it isn’t plausible for the
incumbent to choose any g ≤ g, the chosen level of public goods always has to be g > g
which is implied by proposition 2.
Proof. Proposition 3: From the assumption implied by the model that the level of rents
increases with public good expenditures in equation (4) it is obvious that the higher
level of gchosen from the set P ∈ [g0, . . . , gi, . . . , gn] ,∀i ∈ N increases the utility the
incumbent gets. The set P contains increasing levels of g for every level of expenditures
chosen, meaning that g0 < g1 < g2 < . . . < gn. According to the definition of ψ from (7)
and (8), the choice of ψ is also determined within a set containing increasing members;
S ∈ [ψ0, . . . , ψn] where ψ0 < ψ1 < ψ2 < . . . < ψn, and where n denotes the decision on
the size of spending and taxes, ψ0 is the lowest level chosen implying no taxes and no
spending, while ψn is the highest level chosen implying maximum taxes and spending.
The incumbent party when playing a cooperative strategy as implied in Proposition
3 (beta ≥ β∗) chooses any level within the set Ω ∈ [ψ,ψ], where Ω ⊆ S (a subset of
S). By assumption ψ0 < ψ and ψ < ψn, meaning that the highest level of the threshold
in set S is higher than ψ and that the lowest level of the threshold in S is lower than
ψ. If Ω ⊆ S are both sets contain increasing members and if ψ0 < ψ and ψ < ψn, then
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by choosing the highest ψ within the re-election threshold set Ω in order to maximize
its utility, the incumbent will always chose the level ψ∗ = ψ. The decision of optimal
g∗ = g follows the same intuitive conclusion.
Proof. Proposition 4: From the proof of Proposition 3 and according to the assumptions
of the model presented in Figure 1, it follows that for any ψ∗ = ψ and g∗ = g and
according to the assumption of a negative relationship between ψ and σ, it must be that
the state of the economy is σ. The state of the economy σ is optimal σ∗ = σ (ψ∗ (g∗)),
for any ψ∗ and g∗ chosen that satisfy Proposition 3.
B Appendix
Table 1: Election summary data
Elections/Parties Governor State Senate(Upper) State House(Lower)
Total Democrats 96 218 242
Total Republicans 115 205 181
Total Independent 3 - -
Total elections 214 423 423
Notes: All 48 continental states included, over the period from 1992 until 2008. Total Democrats and
total Republicans includes every time when a Democrat or Republican governor or party would either
win office or hold office. Source and description of data: Election data on both gubernatorial and state
legislature election (upper and lower house) was taken from the Statistical Abstract of the United
States from the years 1992 - 2008 published by the Census Bureau (2011). Notes on electoral results:
Nebraska state legislature is unicameral and non-partisan, so only gubernatorial changes are observed in
this state. In California in 2003 gubernatorial recall elections are accounted as the 2002 elections where
the democrat in power at the time, Gary Davis, instead of ensuring his second term was recalled a year
later. On the new elections the Republican candidate Arnold Schwarzenegger won. The dummy value
given for 2002 is 0, since it is accounted as an incumbent defeat. Gubernatorial and state legislature
elections are all being held in even years except for Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, New Jersey and
Virginia which are held in odd years. The growth effects are all taken into account for these 5 states.
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Table 2: Summary statistics
Variable Observations Mean Std.Dev. Min Max
Re-election 432 0.6041667 0.4895959 0 1
Capital outlays p/c 432 0.7534826 0.2844157 0.2643852 2.712.895
Capital outlays p/c sq 432 0.648441 0.5775933 0.0698995 7.359.799
Public good spending
over other spending 432 0.1630327 0.0399779 0.0744813 0.3138859
Growth of public good
over other spending 384 0.0006781 0.1353455 -0.3617157 0.3969931
Growth of public good
over other spending sq 384 0.0182712 0.0253624 1.67E-08 0.1576035
Term limit 432 0.2175926 0.4130872 0 1
GDP 816 204000000 248000000 12500000 1910000000
Real GDP growth 432 0.0362356 0.0378452 -0.048284 0.3596869
Lag real GDP growth 389 0.0511355 0.0739128 -0.0646949 0.3858965
Budget deficit 720 2178828 6851939 -61400000 83500000
Deficit to GDP 432 0.0101926 0.0199418 -0.0412 0.1928
Deficit to GDP growth 384 -0.034349 9.585826 -95.607 115.729
Expenditures growth 384 0.0748308 0.0482547 -0.0206968 0.3016281
Revenue growth 389 0.0667248 0.1385824 -0.3817504 0.5898104
Personal income 816 30609.88 8492.098 14749.27 63889.87
Personal income growth 384 0.0957109 0.0434129 -0.033 0.2809
Unemployment rate 816 0.0497623 0.0132065 0.0227 0.1122
Unemployment growth 384 -0.0039784 0.2420115 -0.4384 1.027
Population change 389 0.0133309 0.0139159 -0.007776 0.1044776
Share of under 17 384 0.2519826 0.0196887 0.2077 0.3522
Share over 65 384 0.131436 0.068148 0.085 1.42534
Notes: Sources and description of data: Data on public good spending, budget revenues and
expenditures decomposed into the data on capital outlays and current expenditures was taken from the
US Census Bureau (2011) for the entire period observed. The public spending over other spending
ratio was calculated by dividing capital outlay expenditures for each state (denoting public good
expenditures) by all other current expenditures (which accounted total social transfers, public sector
wages and all other expenditures). The capital outlay is defined as: “Direct expenditure for contract or
force account construction of buildings, grounds, and other improvements, and purchase of equipment,
land, and existing structures. Includes amounts for additions, replacements, and major alterations to
fixed works and structures. However, expenditure for repairs to such works and structures is classified
as current operation expenditure.” (US Census Bureau, 2011). Current expenditure “include direct
expenditure for compensation of own officers and employees and for supplies, materials, and
contractual services except amounts for capital outlay, assistance and subsidies, interest on debt, and
insurance benefits and payments”. (US Census Bureau, 2011). Data on GDP and unemployment is
taken from the US Bureau of Economic analysis (2011). Data on population was taken from the
Statistical Abstract of the United States published by the Census Bureau (2011). The dummy variables
on re-election were assigned as specified under equation (23), and according to the data from Table 1.
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Table 3: Public spending and economic growth
Dependent variable:
Threshold (ψ)
(1) Capital
outlays p/c
(2) Capital
outlays p/c
(3) Spending
ratio
(4) Total
expenditures
Lag real GDP growth
(one year before election)
- 0.7082
(-7.82)***
- 0.2533
(-2.77)**
0.0126
(0.85)
-0.0232
(-0.83)
Capital outlays
per capita
0.0278
(2.06)**
Public spending ratio 0.1810
(1.41)
Expenditure growth 0.6356
(3.22)***
0.0631
(2.76)**
Revenue growth -0.1295
(-1.40)
-0.0031
(-0.29)
0.2123
(8.31)***
Term limit -0.0344
(-1.94)**
-0.0018
(-0.84)
0.0108
(2.07)**
Unemployment rate -3.3792
(-2.72)**
0.3233
(-2.25)**
-0.8699
(-2.30)**
Deficit to GDP -1.0644
(-1.37)
-0.1249
(-1.23)
-2.157
(-5.56)***
Population growth -0.8136
(-0.94)
0.2324
(2.12)**
0.3669
(1.43)
Share under 17 -10.916
(-13.06)***
0.0645
(0.73)
-0.1352
(-0.57)
Share over 65 -0.1112
(-2.04)**
0.0047
(0.96)
-0.0198
(-1.34)
F-test 61.09 33.02 4.03 17.67
Observations 389 384 384 384
R-squared 0.5097 0.7383 0.8319 0.4669
Notes: See notes to Table 1 for information on sample variables. For years 2001 and 2003 there was no data
available for state revenues and expenditures, making the panel unbalanced. All regressions are OLS fixed
effects regressions that include a constant and real GDP growth as the main explanatory variable (as according
to equation 24). The dependent variables are capital outlays p/c in regressions (1) and (2), ratio of public good
spending over other spending in (3), and total expenditures in (4). t-statistics are shown in parentheses with
standard errors robust to heteroskedasiticy and clustered by state. *** denotes significance at 1%, ** at 5% and
* at 10%.
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Table 4: Re-election and public good spending
Dependent variable:
Re-election
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Capital outlays
per capita
0.4388
(1.61)*
0.5922
(2.03)**
1.031
(2.90)***
Capital outlays
per capita squared
-0.1349
(-1.07)
-0.2033
(-1.64)*
-0.3635
(-3.04)***
Public spending
ratio growth
0.3916
(2.13)**
0.3552
(1.92)**
0.4053
(2.18)**
Public spending
ratio growth squared
-2.9723
(-2.73)**
-2.843
(-2.56)**
-3.033
(-2.78)**
Term limit -0.2622
(-4.54)***
-0.2606
(-4.48)***
-0.2547
(-4.02)***
-0.2679
(-4.52)***
-0.2674
(-4.45)***
-0.2528
(-4.06)***
GDP growth
(election year)
0.0991
(0.11)
0.3561
(0.31)
-0.4536
(-0.51)
-0.3676
(-0.34)
Lag growth
(previous year)
2.2025
(1.85)*
2.0324
(1.42)
2.268
(1.94)**
1.355
(0.97)
Expenditure growth -0.9206
(-1.28)
-0.7781
(-1.12)
Revenue growth -0.324
(-1.62)*
-0.2295
(-1.19)
Unemployment
growth
-0.1766
(-0.97)
-0.1608
(-0.91)
Deficit to GDP
growth
0.0011
(0.41)
0.0012
(0.36)
Personal income
growth
0.2319
(0.25)
0.3717
(0.41)
Population growth -4.301
(-1.64)*
-4.6431
(-1.76)*
Share under 17 1.1945
(0.40)
-2.0665
(-0.85)
Share over 65 -0.6181
(-6.31)***
-0.6653
(-6.67)***
F-test 8.95 6.67 7.35 12.76 8.65 7.48
Observations 432 432 384 384 384 384
R-squared 0.1778 0.1869 0.2639 0.2361 0.2441 0.2752
Notes: See notes to Table 1 for information on sample variables. All regressions are OLS regressions that
include a constant, the re-election dummy variable and the controls as specified in equation (23). All regressions
include state fixed effects. Re-election dummy variable is the dependent variable, while the main explanatory
variables are public good spending per capita for the first three regressions, and growth of public spending over
other spending for the final three regressions. t-statistics are shown in parentheses with standard errors robust
to heteroskedasiticy and clustered by state. *** denotes significance at 1%, ** at 5% and * at 10%.
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